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Abstract 
The earnings management has attracted scholars, researchers, and policy makers' attention in many countries and has been raised 
as one of the most important issues for investors and owners of corporate interests. The main objective of this study is to 
investigate the possible relationship between earnings management incentives and earnings response coefficient. To investigate 
this matter, a sample of 100 companies have been selected out of companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange and data required 
in the timeframe of 2007 to 2013 have been extracted based on the sample companies. In this study, the correlation coefficient 
was used to analyze the data statistically at 95% level and hypothesis testing was performed with multivariate linear regression 
model. The findings, according to the results of the first and third hypothesis suggest no relationship between earnings 
management incentives and earnings response coefficients, and also the results of the second hypothesis test suggest a negative 
relationship between earnings management incentives and earnings response coefficient in most of the test sub- hypotheses. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of SCIJOUR-Scientific Journals Publisher. 
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1. Introduction 
The primary purpose of financial accounting is to provide useful information for investors to predict the 
performance of the economic unit. The need to report earnings as a primary source for investors, executives and 
analysts' decision-making has been well documented and earnings report helps to the economy in various ways, such 
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as providing a basis for tax calculation, criteria for evaluating the success of the company's performance, to 
determine the amount of divisible earnings, to manage the distribution of earnings, to manage an economic unit and 
other items. Also, because the value of a company is related to the current and future earnings, the determination of 
earnings enjoys a great importance (Ansari et al., 2012).  
The executives often manage the earnings in order to mislead shareholders regarding the company's actual 
economic performance. The earnings management which is performed through the manipulation of real activities or 
accounting figures, reduces the accuracy of the earnings messaging, increases the risk and uncertainty of the people 
outside the organization and also likely leads to an information asymmetry and reduction in the efficiency of 
investment. The earnings management, not only hides the company's actual performance, but also hides the actual 
process of earnings growth and company's revenue that is useful in predicting future growth of the company 
(McNichols & Stubben, 2008).  
The importance of the earnings management is to the extent that in recent years not only many studies have been 
conducted on its different aspects, but also the subjects of earnings management incentives and earnings response 
coefficients have been investigated in many countries, particularly developed ones. Therefore, doing a research on 
the subject and explaining its effects on financial performance can clear the way for the capital market participants 
and insiders' useful economic and investment decision makings. 
2. Literature review  
Many individuals' decisions are based on extra organizational accounting reports. Therefore, executives should 
make decisions on the choice of measurement practices; and financial reporting and accountants have to offer the 
appropriate procedures in order to provide advisory services to executives. The companies' reported earnings has 
always been considered as a financial decision making criteria, but whenever executives and owners' objectives are 
not aligned, the management may provide financial statements in order to serve his/her interests. The users of 
financial information also have always been unhappy from accounting information asymmetry and are looking for 
information that they can use it for rational decision-makings. In other words, digits and numbers can have a booster 
or regulator role in this regard (Watts and  Zimmerman, 1998).  
2.1. The agency theory and earnings management incentives 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) propounded the agency theory which defined the companies' executives as "agents" 
and shareholders as "principals ". In their analysis, a shareholder is at odds with executives. In other words, 
decision-making is delegated to executives. But the problem is that the agents do not decide in favor of principals. 
One of the main hypotheses of agency theory is that "principals" and "agents" are in conflict of interest. In their 
opinion, management incentives are for private interests which are in contrary to the interests of maximizing 
shareholders' wealth. According to this viewpoint, reward incentives, contract incentives (including agreements with 
third parties, secret agreements or commission contracts), political incentives, tax incentives, initial offering to the 
public and change of executives (especially the CEO), the are among the main earnings management incentives. 
2.2. The researchers' perspectives in relation to earnings management 
In connection with the earnings management, the researchers have two views, some researchers believe that with 
companies growing in size, the executives do earnings negative management to reduce the sensitivity. Another view 
believes that with companies growing in size, supervision and social effects of financial reporting results increase; 
and consequently, the manager's tendency increases to manage earnings. Regardless of the above two views, based 
on this assumption that in the real world all people seek to maximize their wealth and prosperity and the executives 
are also not exempt from this rule and the direction of these incentives is not the same in the various executives. So, 
we can expect that earnings management does not depend on the size of the companies. With regard to the 
behavioral aspects of management, with a same reasoning it could be said that earnings management depends on the 
industry which companies operate on it (Etemadi et al, 2012). 
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2.3. The earnings management and the quality of financial statements 
The former director of America stock, Arthur Levitt (1998), believes that the erosion of the quality of financial 
statements is due to the high tendency of executives to achieve the specified earnings or creating savings for false 
accounting. These statements implied a relationship between the effect of earnings management and the risk and 
uncertainty of investors on the earnings quality. The evidences likewise show the increase of investors' distrust, 
especially among companies that were exposed to earnings management. The financial statements of companies 
which have been exposed to earnings management, rather than the actual performance of the company, it reflects the 
interests of executives. Also, the strong market reaction to general news on earnings management represents the 
investors' lack of awareness on executives' incentives (Anvaz, 2011).  
Regarding the matters presented, followed by the researches carried out in other countries and in order to clarify 
the role of earnings management incentives and its impact on financial performance, in this study, the relationship 
between earnings management incentives and earnings response coefficients in companies listed in Tehran Stock 
Exchange, has been studied and the earnings management incentives in earnings response coefficient metrics are 
used to analyze it. 
3. The importance and necessity of research 
The earnings management impresses the healthy life of a business firm and therefore seeks to protect the interests 
of shareholders against the management of the firm. The importance of the earnings management is to the extent 
that in recent years not only many studies have been conducted on its different aspects, but also the subjects of 
earnings management incentives and earnings response coefficients have been investigated in many countries, 
particularly developed ones. Therefore, doing a research on the subject and explaining its effects on financial 
performance can clear the way for the capital market participants and insiders' useful economic and investment 
decision makings. Therefore, doing a research on the subject and explaining its effects on financial performance can 
clear the way for the capital market participants and insiders' useful economic and investment decision makings. 
With the explanation of management incentives on earnings response coefficient, the quality rate of information in 
the presentation of financial statements can be manifested and the executives' manipulation rate in the financial 
statements can be measured. The research on the relationship between factors affecting earnings management 
incentives and their reaction coefficient can lead to useful applications in the capital market. Because, if there is a 
significant relationship, the characteristics and mechanisms of earnings management can be used as a criterion to 
understand and predict the performance of the companies. 
4. The research history 
Some of the research results conducted in relation to earnings management and earnings response coefficient are 
as follows: 
Kormendi and lipe (1987), in their research focused on the magnitude of the relationship between earnings and 
returns and the test regarding the quality of this greatness in the time series properties of earnings. Their Prediction 
indicated that the relationship between the magnitude of stock returns and earnings probably depends on the 
continuity of the profitability process. The research results in the model which they have designed on the basis of the 
continuity of profitability, confirmed their prediction and one of the factors affecting earnings response coefficient 
entitled the continuity of the profitability process was specified. Chambers et al. (2005), in their study examined the 
effect of risk on earnings response coefficient. They defined the ultimate risk as uncertainty about future dividends 
or future earnings. Based on the results, they found that the ultimate risk has a positive relationship with earnings 
response coefficient. 
 Cheris and sommers (2005), in their study, correlated the earnings response coefficients directly with the 
continuity of profitability process to provide another way to interpret the market through the information transmitted 
by the announcement and publication of earnings. The difference between this study and other studies concerning 
the effect of the continuity of the profitability process on the earnings response coefficient was that instead of 
continuing profitability process, the continuity of unexpected earnings process has been considered as a variable 
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5. Research purposes and hypotheses 
Regarding the aforementioned matters, the main purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between 
earnings management incentives and earnings response coefficients in companies listed on the Stock Exchange in 
Tehran is trying to answer the following questions: 
Is there a significant relationship between the earnings management incentives and earnings response coefficient 
in the companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange?  
With regard to the aforementioned purpose and some evaluation models and the results of similar studies 
including Anvaz (2011), it is specified that there is a negative relationship between earnings management incentives 
and earnings response coefficient. Therefore research hypotheses to answer the research question is formulated as 
follows: 
x The relationship between the plan executive compensation and earnings response coefficient is negative. 
x There is a negative relationship between debt limit and earnings response coefficient. 
x The relationship between the reduction of the executives' financial performance and earnings response coefficient 
is negative. 
6. Research methodology 
The research is an applied one in terms of the purpose and the method used is descriptive. And since it is going to 
find a significant relationship between the research variables as well as the precinct of the changes in the dependent 
variable with respect to the changes in the independent variable, it is a correlational research. The statistical model 
used in this study was a multiple regression model. The information required by the companies has been extracted 
through databases including Rhavarde-Nowin software and the official website of the Tehran Stock Exchange. Then, 
with sum up and needed calculations in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, the hypotheses were tested using panel data. 
7. The statistical population and sampling 
The study sample included companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange in the period covered includes a period of 
seven years from the beginning of 2007 until the end of 2013. The sample has been selected using the elimination 
method and based on the following criteria: 
x Financial information to be available during the study period. 
x In terms of increase in comparability, the end of the company's financial year should finish to the end of March 
and not to change fiscal year during the study period. The reason for choosing these criteria was that the time 
periods to be similar as much as possible and conditions and seasonal factors not to be effective in the selection 
of variables and factors. 
x They should not be one of the banks and financial institutions (investment companies, financial brokers, holding 
companies and leasing). The reason for choosing this criterion is the different structure of the income statement 
of these companies compared with other firms. 
x In order to homogenize the statistical sample in the study period, by the end of 1385, the companies should be 
listed in Tehran Stock Exchange and during the years 1386 to 1392 not to exist from Tehran Stock Exchange.  
x The companies should not lose money in any of the years studied. 
In this study, after applying the conditions mentioned above, 100 companies out of the companies listed in Tehran 
Stock Exchange that were eligible for the study, were selected as the sample. 
8. Data analysis 
As mentioned, the aim of the study is to show the relationship between earnings management incentives and 
earnings response coefficients in the companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange, given that earnings management 
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It should be noted that before the model estimation, it should be specified that there is individual differences or 
the so-called heterogeneity in the sections, or that are similar to each other, and for estimation, the statistical data 
should be accumulated over each other and do the estimation using pooling data or panel data methods. F Limmer 
test has been used to choose one of the methods namely pooling data or panel data, that with regard to Table (1), is 
the four models (p-value = 0.000 < 0.05),  so the null hypothesis regarding the ability to estimate the data using 
pooling data method will not be accepted and the data should be estimated by the panel model. 
Having been assured that the model should be estimated in the form of panel, the most important question is that 
whether the temporary effects are fixed (existence of fixed effects) or random (existence of random effects)? To 
answer to the above question Hausman test was used in this study. According to Table 1, in order to determine the 
fixed effects or random effects in four models, the null hypothesis regarding the existence of random effects 
 (p-value = 0.000 < 0.05), is rejected, so the model has been estimated as fixed effects. Watson camera statistic value 
according to Table (1), for four models is between 1/5 and 2/5. This number shows that the errors are independent of 
each other and there is no correlation between errors (the hypothesis regarding the correlation between errors is 
rejected) and regression can be used. Additionally, considering the fact that the significance level of the F-statistic of 
the F-Fisher in the four under test models is (p-value = 0.000 < 0.05), therefore, based on the analysis carried out, the 
whole model (four models tested) is significant at 99% confidence level. Then, the results obtained from testing the 
hypotheses have been analyzed as follows: 
9.1. The first hypothesis test results 
The first main research hypothesis is as follows: 
The relationship between the executive compensation plan and earnings response coefficient is negative. Since four 
indexes have been separately considered for earnings response coefficient, so four tested subsidiary hypotheses and 
the interpretation of the results obtained from Table (1), are as follows: 
9.1.1. There is a negative relationship between executive compensation plan and net profit.  
Statistically, There is no significant relationship between the executive compensation plan (BNS) and the net 
profit (R) of the selected companies, (p-value = 0.399 > 0.05). So the above hypothesis is rejected. 
9.1.2. There is a negative relationship between the executive compensation plan and operating profit.  
Statistically, There is a significant and reverse relationship (coefficient value = - 0.96) between the executive 
compensation plan (BNS) and the operating profit (EARN) of the selected companies at a confidence level of 99%, 
(p-value = 0.006 < 0.05). So the above hypothesis is confirmed. 
9.1.3. There is a negative relationship between executive compensation plan and cash on hand from operating 
activities.  
Statistically, there is no significant relationship between the executive compensation plan (BNS) and cash on 
hand from operating activities (CFO) of the selected companies, (p-value = 0.021 > 0.05). So the above hypothesis 
is rejected. 
9.1.4. There is a negative relationship between executive compensation plan and the total accruals.  
Statistically, there is no significant relationship between the executive compensation plan (BNS) and the total 
accruals (TAC) of the selected companies, (p-value = 0.479 > 0.05). So the above hypothesis is rejected. 
According to the subjects mentioned in the first hypothesis, the subsidiary hypothesis 1.2 shows the negative 
relationship between executive compensation plan and operating profit and in the three other hypotheses, there has 
been no significant relationship between executive compensation plan and earnings response coefficient. 
Durbin-
Watson 1.86   2.40   2.03   1.92  
F Fisher 5.69  0.000 12.22  0.000 27.99  0.000 4.08  0.000
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9.2. The second hypothesis test results 
The second main research hypothesis is as follows: 
There is a negative relationship between debt limit and earnings response coefficient. In this study, two indexes 
namely financing from capital and financing from debt has been used to measure the debt limit and four indexes of  
earnings response coefficient, so eight tested subsidiary hypotheses and the interpretation of the results obtained 
from Table (1), are as follows: 
9.2.1. There is a negative relationship between financing from capital and the company's net profit.  
Statistically, there is a significant and reverse relationship between financing from capital (XFE) and the net 
profit (R) of the selected companies at a confidence level of 99%, (p-value = 0.009 < 0.05). So the above hypothesis 
is confirmed. 
9.2.2. There is a negative relationship between financing from capital and operating profit.  
Statistically, there is no significant relationship between the financing from capital (XFE) and the operating profit 
(EARN) of the selected companies, (p-value = 0.980 > 0.05). So the above hypothesis is rejected. 
9.2.3. There is a negative relationship between financing from capital and cash from operating activities.  
Statistically, There is no significant relationship between the financing from capital (XFE) and the cash from 
operating activities (CFO) of the selected companies, (p-value = 0.070 > 0.05). So the above hypothesis is rejected. 
9.2.4. There is a negative relationship between financing from capital and total accruals.  
Statistically, there is a significant and reverse relationship (coefficient value = - 4.91) between financing from 
capital (XFE) and the total accruals (TAC) of the selected companies at a confidence level of 99%,  
(p-value = 0.005 < 0.05). So the above hypothesis is confirmed. 
9.2.5. There is a negative relationship between financing from debt and the company's net profit.  
Statistically, there is a significant and reverse relationship (coefficient value = - 0.08) between financing from 
debt (XFD) and the net profit (R) of the selected companies at a confidence level of 99%, (p-value = 0.001< 0.05). 
So the above hypothesis is confirmed. 
9.2.6. There is a negative relationship between financing from debt and operating profit.  
Statistically, there is a significant and reverse relationship (coefficient value = - 0.04) between financing from 
debt (XFD) and the operating profit (EARN) of the selected companies at a confidence level of 99%,  
(p-value = 0.000 < 0.05). So the above hypothesis is confirmed. 
9.2.7. There is a negative relationship between financing from debt and cash from operating activities.  
Statistically, there is a significant and reverse relationship (coefficient value = - 0.01) between financing from 
debt (XFD) and the cash from operating activities (CFO) of the selected companies at a confidence level of 99%,  
(p-value = 0.000 < 0.05). So the above hypothesis is confirmed. 
9.2.8. There is a negative relationship between financing from debt and ctotal accruals.  
Statistically, there is a significant and reverse relationship (coefficient value = - 0.07) between financing from 
debt (XFD) and the total accruals (TAC) of the selected companies at a confidence level of 99%, 
 (p-value = 0.004 < 0.05). So the above hypothesis is confirmed. 
According to the subjects mentioned in the second hypothesis, in six of the eight sub-hypotheses, there is a 
negative and significant relationship between the debt limit and earnings response coefficient which reflects the 
reduction in earnings quality, and in two other hypotheses there is no significant relationship between the debt limit 
and earnings response coefficient. 
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9.3. The third hypothesis test results 
The third main research hypothesis is as follows: 
There is a negative relationship between the decline in executives' financial performance and earnings response 
coefficient. Since four indexes have been separately measured for earnings response coefficient, so, four tested 
subsidiary hypotheses and the interpretation of the results obtained from Table (1), are as follows: 
9.3.1. There is a negative relationship between the reduction in executives' financial performance and the net profit.  
Statistically, there is no significant relationship between the reduction in executives' financial performance 
(EDSS) and the net profit (R) of the selected companies, (p-value = 0.292 > 0.05). So the above hypothesis is 
rejected. 
9.3.2. There is a negative relationship between the reduction in executives' financial performance and the operating 
profit.  
Statistically, there is no significant relationship between the reduction in executives' financial performance 
(EDSS) and the operating profit (EARN) of the selected companies, (p-value = 0.932 > 0.05). So the above 
hypothesis is rejected. 
9.3.3. There is a negative relationship between the reduction in executives' financial performance and the operating 
activities.  
Statistically, there is no significant relationship between the reduction in executives' financial performance 
(EDSS) and the operating activities (CFO) of the selected companies, (p-value = 0.690 > 0.05). So the above 
hypothesis is rejected. 
9.3.4. There is a negative relationship between the reduction in executives' financial performance and the total 
accruals.  
Statistically, there is no significant relationship between the reduction in executives' financial performance 
(EDSS) and the total accruals (TAC) of the selected companies, (p-value = 0.275 > 0.05). So the above hypothesis is 
rejected. 
According to the subjects mentioned in the third hypothesis, there is not any significant relationship between the 
reduction in executives' financial performance and earnings response coefficient. 
 Table 2. The summary of the statistical relationship between earnings management incentives and earnings response coefficient 
Independent 
and control 
variables 
Model 1. The 
dependent variable R 
Model 2. The dependent 
variable EARN 
Model 3. The dependent 
variable CFO 
Model 4. The dependent 
variable TAC 
 atistical relationships type Statistical relationships type Statistical relationships type Statistical relationships type 
     
BNS  negative   
XFE negative   negative 
XFD negative negative negative negative 
EDSS     
LEV* positive positive  positive 
DAC positive positive positive positive 
GROW     
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* One of the most important criteria for corporate profitability is the degree of industry leverage (LEV) that in 
this research has a positive and significant relationship between profitability and the degree of industry leverage. 
** meaning that investors consider respond to earnings, firm size (SIZE), or in other words, the total assets of the 
company as a positive factor during respond to the earnings. 
 
10. Discussion  
Since the recent studies have shown that the quality of accounting information leave the significant economic 
consequences behind, the determinants of the quality of information are very important factors. Meanwhile, the 
management reporting decisions are one of the most important determinants of the quality of accounting 
information. The aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between earnings management incentives and 
earnings response coefficients in companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange and the incentives including the 
financial incentive, debt limits and reduction in the executives' performance have been used. 
The results of the first hypothesis test showed that out of four sub-hypotheses, there is a significant and negative 
relationship only between the executive compensation plan and earnings response coefficient (a measure of 
operating profit) that is compatible with the researches conducted Darabi et al. (2012) and Anvaz (2011). In the 
other three hypotheses, there is no significant relationship that, the results of these three hypotheses are in line with 
the study carried out by Moradi et al (2009). The results of the second hypothesis test indicates a negative 
relationship between earnings management incentives and earnings response coefficients in six of the eight sub-
hypotheses hypothesis that the result of the mentioned hypotheses are compatible with the researches carried out by 
Darabi et al. (2012) and Anvaz (2011). Finally, the results of the third hypothesis suggests that there is no statistical 
meaningful relationship between the reduction in executives' performance and earnings response coefficient in the 
four subsidiary hypotheses. The result of the third main hypothesis is compatible with the study conducted by 
Moradi et al. (2009), and is not in line with Anvaz's research (2011).  In general, theoretically there is a negative 
relationship between the earnings management incentives on earnings response coefficient. In such circumstances, 
the management involvement in the financial reporting process decreases the quality of the reported data. For the 
proper functioning of financial markets, especially the capital market, the existence of a high-quality information is 
necessary. So that, regarding the released information, a sound decision making take place when the mentioned 
information are on time, relevant, reliable, important, complete and understandable, otherwise it will lead to 
information asymmetry. In an environment where investors have less information compared to the executives, they 
cannot observe and supervise the company's performance and its prospects thoroughly. Therefore, in such an 
environment, the executives can use the available flexibility in applying the accounting options for opportunistic 
earnings management. The theoretical and empirical studies show that whatever a company's disclosed information 
enjoys a higher quality, the earnings management have occurred to a lesser extent, in other words, there is a 
significant relationship between the reporting quality and earnings management. 
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